Zakaj so se ljudje v ZSSR udeležili volitev?

Zakaj so se ljudje v ZSSR udeležili volitev?


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Znano je, da je bil na volitvah v ZSSR na listi le en kandidat, ki volivcu ni dal prave izbire.

Čeprav je bilo mogoče glasovati proti kandidatu, ni bilo realne možnosti, da bi bil volivec v večini, da kandidat ne bi uspel. Še več, pri ukrepanju proti politiku je bilo veliko učinkovitejših sredstev: pritožba na lokalno pisarno stranke, nato na višjo, nato morda na tisk, nato na avtoritativne ljudi in na koncu morda na tožilstvo, če bi bilo sum na kaznivo dejanje (in le nekaj nadpovprečno živahnega ali neprimernega vedenja bi lahko bil zadosten razlog za preiskavo ali izključitev iz stranke). Glasovanje proti bi bilo popolnoma nesmiselno.

Kljub temu za neudeležbo ni bilo kazni (za razliko od Severne Koreje, kjer je glasovanje obvezno). Kljub temu je na volitvah sodelovalo veliko ljudi. Poleg tega je bila volilna udeležba v ZSSR veliko višja kot udeležba v sodobni Rusiji, kjer lahko na različne načine glasujete za različne politike.

Kaj je bil razlog za tako visoko udeležbo? Nekateri trdijo, da je bilo to zato, ker je bilo na volilnih mestih mogoče kupiti primanjkljajno hrano, vendar se mi to ne zdi povsem zadovoljiva razlaga, zlasti glede na to, da se je praksa ponujanja hrane na glasovalnih mestih s časom spreminjala in je v pozni ZSSR dosegla vrhunec .


Iz komentarja Sasse NF:

V resničnem življenju sem starše vprašal, zakaj bi še vedno glasovali - to sem vprašal po razpadu ZSSR. Odgovor je bil točno to, kar sem rekel - "si jezen? To bi bilo takoj znano in posledice bi bile"

Zanimalo me je in vprašalo mamo. Rodila se je v zgodnjih petdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, zato njen odgovor zajema leta 1969 do 1986. (Leta 1986 se je začela perestrojka in sovjetski režim je začel popuščati).

Rekla je, da se je prvič zaradi radovednosti udeležila volitev leta 1969, ko je lahko glasovala. Potem se je komaj udeležila volitev, do leta 1989. Posledic ni bilo. Bila je običajna sovjetska oseba, z univerzitetno izobrazbo (ekonomistka).

Njen brat je bil član komunistične partije in je dejansko služil v aparatu okrožnega odbora (nekakšen aparat urada podžupana, odgovoren za upravljanje okrožja v Jekaterinburgu, takrat Sverdlovsku). Poleg tega je bila njegova dolžnost zagotoviti prisotnost različnih "propagandnih materialov" na ulicah, kolikor se spomnim.

Edini očitki, ki jih je dobila, so bili očitki njene mame, moje babice, ki ji je blago očitala, da je tako malomarna, medtem ko je njen brat ves dan sedel na volilni lokaciji (bil je v volilni komisiji). Nikoli ni trpel zaradi sestrine odsotnosti.

Tudi moj oče ni nikoli glasoval. Zbudil se je zgodaj na dan glasovanja in odšel na volilno mesto, da bi kupil nekaj primanjkljaja, preden je bilo razprodano. To je bila prava spodbuda. Zahodni človek bi si težko predstavljal, kakšna spodbuda je bila v primanjkljajnem gospodarstvu. Ko je kupil blago, se je obrnil in odšel domov, potem ko je opravil sladko FA v smislu dejanskega glasovanja.

Povedal mi je, da bi lahko hipotetično na delovnem mestu očitali, da ni glasoval, in sumi, da ne bi mogel dobiti nekaj boljših ugodnosti, ki so na voljo tistim, ki so se zmotili v sistemu. To pomeni, da si ne bi mogli privoščiti turističnega potovanja v državo vzhodne Evrope. Vendar se mu to ni zdelo resno. Ni bil član stranke in verjel je, da je črnomorska obala v redu za družinsko potovanje, če bi se v zameno vsaj delno izognili sodelovanju v cirkusu.

Kaj je bil razlog za tako visoko udeležbo?

Poskušal sem poiskati v Googlu nekaj besedil, ki so jih napisali poklicni zgodovinarji na to temo. Hitro googlanje je prineslo en majhen članek, katerega avtor (Alexander Fokin) omenja pomen propagande in dejavnik, da so ljudje previdni, da ne izpadejo iz vrstice, da z odsotnostjo ne pritegnejo pozornosti. Toda ali je bila to v letih po Stalinu dovolj močna spodbuda? Našel sem tudi disertacijo Andreja Podosinnikova, ki zajema obdobje od 1950-1970. Navaja, da so bile volitve široko propagandne in so se za večino prebivalstva spremenile v nekakšen praznik. V tem prazničnem vzdušju je šlo le za tradicijo »glasovanja«, čeprav je večina ljudi razumela laž procesa.

Prepričan sem, da bi se mojih staršev v času Stalina udeleževal volitev: strah je bil močan, ko je bil Stalin živ. Nimam razloga dvomiti o njihovih poročilih o obdobju sedemdesetih in osemdesetih let. Lahko bi namigovali, da je prišlo do obsežnih manipulacij s statistiko s strani komisij na nizki ravni. Moje površno googlanje ni prineslo nobenega dela na to temo. Če bi jih našel v prihodnosti, bi svoj odgovor razširil. Do takrat bo v bistvu ostalo nekaj ponarejenih računov iz prve roke.


Reference:

  • Александр Фокин: Izbori v SSSR v letih 1960-1970-e leta: simulacija ali element demokracije?

  • Podosinnikov Andrej Юрьевич. ISTORIČESKI OPYT PROVEDENIJA VYBOROV V ORGANY NARODNEGO PREDSTAVITELЬSTVA NA TERRITORIJI KURSKI OBLASTI V 1950-1970-e гг.


Ko govorite o sodelovanju in številu glasov za kandidata, morate upoštevati, da so bile te številke večinoma lažne. Nihče res ni štel. Še ena stvar, ki jo zahodnjaki težko razumejo, je stalen občutek strahu. Ljudje so vedeli, da obstaja zapisnik, kdo je glasoval in kdo ne. Verjeli so tudi, da je mogoče spremljati, kako so glasovali.

In to se je res zgodilo. Pridete na volišče, pokažete svojo osebno izkaznico (notranji potni list), dali vam bodo papir in vas obvestili, da ste glasovali.

Bližje zvečer so šli iskat ljudi, ki niso glasovali, potrkali na njihova vrata in prosili za glasovanje. Nihče ni hotel težav (z zelo redkimi izjemami).

Kakor koli že, ljudje so želeli, da jih prijatelji, sosedje in kolegi vidijo v bližini volilnih čevljev, da ne govorimo o tistih preprostih ljudeh, ki so se vedno vrteli.

(Ta odgovor je račun udeleženca).


Tudi v ZDA vaš sodelovanje na volitvah se zabeleži: ko pridete na stojnico, je vaše ime označeno v dnevnikih. Zagotovo je bil posnet v ZSSR in zaradi "propiska"(obvezna registracija vašega naslova pri lokalni vladi) so uradniki natančno vedeli, kje najti tiste, ki so pokazali svojo nelojalnost vladi, ker so zavrnili glasovanje. Slišal sem iz prve roke pripovedovalcev CPSU na nižji ravni, ki so so bili poslani na te naslove ob koncu volilnega dne, da bi ugotovili, ali imajo tisti, ki so izpustili glasovanje, sprejemljiv izgovor (na primer bolezen) in jih opomnili na njihove državljanske dolžnosti, če niso.

Tisti, ki so služili v vojski, sploh niso imeli izbire. Nekatere enote so imele "tekmovanja v glasovanju": enote so tekmovale, kdo bo glasoval hitreje. Vojaki so se postavili v red pod nadzorom svojih oficirjev in ko so dobili ukaz za glasovanje na začetku volilnega časa, bi se vrstice teči po kabinah in vpisali svoje glasove točno tako, kot je naročeno čim prej. Enota, ki je bila najpočasnejša, je bila zaradi pomanjkanja discipline ukorena.

Skratka, udeležba na volitvah in ponujena izbira nista bili stvar svobodne volje državljana v ZSSR. Bil je "balagan", oddaja. Nisem povsem prepričan, kateremu namenu je služil. Je bilo lažno pokazati svojim državljanom, da so njihove odločitve pomembne? Je bilo lažno pokazati tujcem, da je ZSSR demokracija? zamisel o demokraciji? ("Mislite, da glasujejo v ZDA? Ja, prav, za oddajo glasujejo tako kot vi pri nas.") Ali je šlo le za odkrivanje premalo zvestih državljanov? Je to bila neka kombinacija zgoraj navedenih razlogov?


Samo preberite zakon.

Poziv o volitvah v Vrhovnem Sovjetu SSSR (1945), to je Kip volitev v vrhovni svet ZSSR (1945) navaja:

Статья 106. Če je število glasov po okrožju manj kot polovica volivcev, ki imajo pravo glasovanja v tem okrožju, okrožna volilna komisija po volitvah v Sovjetski zvezi ali po volitvah v Sovjetu držav članic, je to opozorilo na protokole in sporočilo Nemedlenno na osrednji volilni komisiji in v Izbiralniku komisijo na volitvah v Sovjetu Nacionalnih zvez Kozinske, avtonomni res-publici, avtonomni regiji ali nacionalno-regionalni skupnosti. V tem primeru, če centralna izbirna komisija določi nove volitve, se ne odloči, če v dveh tednih po prvih volitvah.

rahlo urejen prevod google:

106. člen Če je določeno število glasov v volilnem okraju manjše od polovice volilnih upravičencev, volilnih v tem okrožju, okrajna volilna komisija za volitve v svet sindikata in za volitve v svet narodnosti ugotavlja dejstvo, protokol in takoj poroča centralni volilni komisiji in volilni komisiji za volitve v svet narodnosti zvezne republike, avtonomne republike, avtonomne regije ali državnega območja. V tem primeru osrednja volilna komisija imenuje nove volitve najkasneje dva tedna po prvih volitvah.

z drugimi besedami, če bi bila udeležba nizka, bi morali v dveh tednih vse ponoviti.

Že samo to je dober razlog za spodbujanje udeležencev.


Tako kot na samih volitvah se dogajanje v ZSSR ni nujno ujemalo z dogajanjem pravil in zakona. Ljudje bi bili lahko previdni, da če ne boste videli glasovanja, bi imele posledice, ne glede na to, kaj pravi zakon.


Dejansko je bilo veliko dejavnikov.

  • Ljudje so bili ne zavedajo da obstajajo drugi pristopi. Zahodnjaku je težko verjeti, toda komunistična propaganda je delovala zelo dobro: res so verjeli to je edini način glasovanja, "gnili zahod" pa ima še slabše razmere;
  • Velika večina ljudi je verjela, da lahko spremeniti vsaj nekaj na lokalni ravni. Na primer, izvolitev "boljšega" komunista bi mu pomagala pri lobiranju interesov mesta na "republikanski" ravni;
  • "Donos" (Wikipedia, RUS), navada vložitve pritožb pri KGB (ali sindikatu ali lokalnem strankarskem jedru), kot sredstvo za zmago na tekmovanju, je bila razširjena po celotnem sovjetskem sistemu. Če ste videli nekaj in se nisem pritoževal, se bo pritožil na vas (zaradi ne pritoževanja). Torej če Alice se niso udeležili „volitev“ in Bob videl, bo ali bo Bobova pritožuj se naprej Alice ali Charliejev pritožuj se nad obema Alice (za neudeležbo) in Bob (za pritožbe);
    • To ne pomeni, da vas bo KGB naslednjo noč ob 4. uri nujno pripeljal v koncentracijsko taborišče GULAG. Morda pa boste v prihodnjih dejavnostih opazili nekaj nepričakovanih ovir: manjša je nezmožnost, da bi naslednje poletje za svoje otroke dobili brezplačno vstopnico za „pansionat“ (Počitniška hiša). Tam so vstopnice »Sindikati« podelili najbolj zvestim »državljanom«.
  • Tisti, ki so resnično razumeli situacijo, so tudi spoznali, da je teh 99,9% glasov ponarejenih. Ne glede na to, ali se ga udeležite ali ne, vaš „glas“ bo preštet;
  • Ne zanemarjajte pomena možnosti nakup pomanjkljive hrane, tudi. Kljub mizernim „plačam“ je bil primanjkljaj še močnejši. Večina ljudi je imela neuporabljenega denarja, udeležba na „volitvah“ pa je bila odlična priložnost, da si vsaj nekaj kupiš. Prav tako bi nasprotoval točki "praksa ponujanja hrane na glasovalnih mestih ... je dosegla vrhunec v pozni ZSSR", zame je bilo obratno: začelo se je zmanjševati konec osemdesetih let in skoraj izgubiti do leta 1990, ko ni bilo več kaj ponuditi.

Povzetek

Sistem je zgrajen na ta način, dobesedno mu ni bilo mogoče ubežati.


To besedilo o udeležbi na sovjetskih volitvah sem našel na spletnem mestu Moskovske državne univerze. Ne vem, kdo je avtor.

Nekaj ​​točk:

  • Na volitvah bi lahko udarili vse kandidate in pisali po svoje. Na glasovanju je bilo prostor za to. Glasovalni seznam po tem ne bi veljal za neveljavnega (za razliko od sodobne Rusije). Če bi to storila večina, bi se za izvoljenega štelo ročno napisano osebno.

  • Včasih so se zgodili primeri, ko so se prebivalci bivalnega bloka strinjali, da na primer ne bodo šli na volitve, dokler država ne izvede kapitalne obnove njihove hiše. To bi bil izreden incident, o katerem bi poročali najvišjim nivojem, vse zahteve pa bi bile takoj izpolnjene. Nekateri starejši ljudje zaradi te navade še vedno pravijo, "da ne gremo na volitve, ker to in to ni bilo storjeno" Avtor pravi, da je to zato, ker ljudje ne razumejo, da je sovjetske oblasti konec in da to ne bi več delovalo.


Na sovjetskih volitvah je bilo pogosto veliko kandidatov, res veliko strank. Seveda so morale vse stranke in kandidate odobriti ustrezni organi CPSU, zaradi česar so bile precej marionete CPSU (kar je bila bistvo).
Poleg Alexovega odličnega povzetka o delovanju ZSSR (ki se mu številne evropske države zelo približujejo, na primer na Nizozemskem je zabeležen vsak volivec, kar je lahko ali pa tudi ne povezano z njegovimi dejanskimi glasovi (v primeru elektronskega glasovanja, zagotovo imajo možnost, toda ali je to res storjeno, mi ni znano), ljudje bi lahko glasovali za lokalno prebivalstvo, zlasti na lokalnih in regionalnih volitvah, v upanju, da bi jim vaš vaški/mestni kandidat lahko naredil nekaj na višjih ravneh strankarske birokracije na koncu.


Udeležba na volitvah

Stopnja volilne udeležbe je odvisna od številnih dejavnikov, vključno z vrsto volilnega sistema, družbenimi skupinami, ki jim pripadajo volivci, osebnostmi in prepričanji volivcev, njihovim prebivališčem in vrsto drugih idiosinkratičnih dejavnikov.

Raven in vrsta volitev močno vplivata na stopnjo volilne udeležbe. Volilna udeležba je na državnih kot na državnih ali pokrajinskih volitvah večja, na slednjih pa večja kot na lokalnih volitvah. Če lokalne volitve potekajo hkrati z deželnimi ali državnimi volitvami, je na splošno dosežena večja volilna udeležba kot pri volitvah, ki ne potekajo hkrati. Ali so volitve partizanske ali nestrankarske, vpliva tudi na volilno udeležbo, saj se na nestrankarskih volitvah udeleži manj ljudi. Podporniki političnih strank volijo pogosteje kot tisti brez partijske identifikacije. Udeležba je običajno tudi večja na volitvah kandidatov kot na volitvah brez kandidatov, kot so referendumi. Obstajajo dokazi, da imajo volitve, ki temeljijo na sorazmerni zastopanosti, višjo volilno udeležbo kot volitve večine ali večine. Volilna udeležba je v nekonkurenčnih ali varnih volilnih okrajih ponavadi znižana, v konkurenčnih pa višja. Zaznana bližina volilnega tekmovanja in stopnja ideološke polarizacije med strankami ali kandidati lahko vplivata na konkurenčnost volitev in posledično na njihovo udeležbo. Pogostost volitev je povezana tudi z udeležbo volivcev, saj se v državah, kjer so volitve pogostejše, udeležuje manj ljudi.

Tehnične značilnosti volilne zakonodaje lahko odvzamejo volilno pravico mnogim potencialnim volivcem. Na primer, ljudje, ki spremenijo zakonito prebivališče, lahko začasno izgubijo glas zaradi zahtev glede bivanja volivcev v svojem novem volilnem okraju. Zapleteni postopki registracije volivcev v kombinaciji z visoko stopnjo geografske mobilnosti bistveno zmanjšajo število aktivnega volivca v Združenih državah, medtem ko se v mnogih drugih državah število volivcev poveča z registracijo, ki jo je sprožila vlada tik pred volitvami . Registracija volivcev v Združenih državah je v veliki meri prepuščena pobudam posameznikov in političnih strank, čeprav so bili poskusi povečati registracijo volivcev v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja z izvajanjem "zakonov o volilcih za motoriste", ki so državljanom omogočali, da se registrirajo za glasovanje, ko so prejeli ali podaljšali vozniško dovoljenje.

Relativno nizka stopnja volilne udeležbe je povezana z nizko stopnjo izobrazbe, poklicnim statusom in dohodkom. Tiste skupine v družbi, ki so bile nazadnje upravičene do glasovanja, prav tako volijo manj. V 20. stoletju so ženske v daljšem časovnem obdobju glasovale manj pogosto kot moški, čeprav se je razlika do konca stoletja v večini držav izbrisala. Stopnje udeležbe rasnih manjšin so na splošno nižje kot pri večinskih skupinah, pripadniki delavskega razreda pa glasovajo manj pogosto kot pripadniki srednjega razreda. V mnogih državah je udeležba mladih bistveno nižja kot pri starejših.

Neuspeh nekaterih vrst ljudi na volitvah ima pomembne posledice. Večina analiz je ugotovila, da če bi glasovali vsi volivci, bi ravnovesje volilnih moči dalo prednost nedavno upravičenim in manj privilegiranim članom družbe.

Majhna skupina ljudi je vestnih volivcev. Drugi, ki glasovanje dojemajo bolj kot instrument zaupanja kot podpore, morda ne bodo glasovali, ker so zadovoljni s sedanjo vlado. Ta skupina prostovoljnih volivcev pa je tudi majhna. Pravzaprav so volivci na splošno manj zadovoljni s političnim statusom kot volivci. Glasovanje je precej topel in neučinkovit instrument za izražanje nezadovoljstva, neglasovanje pa je bolj verjetno simptom odtujenosti od političnega sistema kot zadovoljstva z njim.

Na posamezno udeležbo na določenih volitvah vplivajo številni naključni dejavniki. Intenzivnost volilnih kampanj se razlikuje. Krizno vzdušje lahko ob eni priložnosti povzroči glasovanje velikega števila ljudi, ob drugi pa možnost glasovanja za ekstremističnega kandidata poveča udeležbo običajno nezainteresiranih. Tudi vreme lahko vpliva na volilno udeležbo.

Sodelovanje volivcev se od države do države razlikuje. Na primer, na predsedniških volitvah v ZDA sodeluje približno polovica prebivalcev v volilni dobi. Nasprotno pa imajo številne evropske države stopnje udeležbe več kot 80 odstotkov. Tudi v Evropi se udeležba močno razlikuje. Tako je na primer po drugi svetovni vojni Italija v povprečju imela okoli 90 odstotkov, medtem ko se na volitvah v Švici udeleži manj kot 40 odstotkov volivcev. Raziskave so pokazale dolgotrajno upadanje volilne udeležbe na državnih volitvah v zahodnih demokracijah od sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, zdi se najverjetneje, da je to posledica partizanske ločenosti (tj. vere in naraščajoče nezadovoljstvo volivcev.


Sodelovanje znotraj nacistične Nemčije

V tridesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so številni Nemci podpirali prizadevanja nacističnega režima, da bi Jude odstranili iz nemškega političnega, družbenega, gospodarskega in kulturnega življenja. Nacistični aktivisti-lokalni nacistični voditelji in člani nacističnih paravojaških organizacij, SA in SS ter Hitlerjeve mladine-so uporabili ustrahovanje Judov in nejudov za uveljavljanje nacističnih družbenih in kulturnih norm. Na primer, nadlegovali so Nemce, ki so vstopili v judovske trgovine ali so bili prijazni do Judov.

Toda tudi Nemci, ki niso delili skrajnega nacističnega prepričanja, da so "Judje" vir "rasnega onesnaženja", so v različni meri sodelovali pri preganjanju Judov. Na primer, člani športnih klubov, knjižnih skupin in drugih prostovoljnih združenj so izgnali Jude. Najstniki v šolah in na univerzah so uživali novo odkrito svobodo nadlegovanja judovskih sošolcev ali celo odraslih. Mnogi navadni Nemci so se vključili, ko so pridobili judovska podjetja, domove ali premoženje, ki so se prodajali po ugodnih cenah ali pa so imeli koristi od zmanjšane poslovne konkurence, saj so Jude pregnali iz gospodarstva. S temi pridobitvami so ti posamezniki razvili delež v stalnem preganjanju.

Nekateri najemodajalci in sosedje so najemnike ali druge posameznike obsodili zaradi zasebnega vedenja, ki so ga opazili. To je vključevalo kaznivo dejanje »rasne umazanije«, spolne odnose med Judi in osebami »nemške ali sorodne krvi« ali kršitve 175. člena nemškega kazenskega zakonika, ki prepoveduje homoseksualnost.

Nemci, ki niso igrali aktivne vloge, so se na judovsko preganjanje odzvali na različne načine. Veliko število jih je pasivno potekalo z izključevanjem Judov s svojega delovnega mesta in z njihovo izolacijo v šolah in skupnostih. Drugi so kot opazovalci navijali za dogodke, kot so javne parade, da bi osramotili tiste, ki so obtoženi "rasne nečistosti".

Nacistične politike in dejanja, skupaj z odzivi elitnih in navadnih Nemcev, so dosegle vrhunec v skoraj popolni izolaciji Judov od nemške družbe do konca leta 1938. Čeprav so mnogi Nemci odobravali marginalizacijo Judov, niso odobravali nasilja in uničenja premoženja. ki so se zgodili med pogromi, ki so jih vodili nacisti, od 9. do 10. novembra 1938 (Kristallnacht). Le malo jih je spregovorilo. Enako je bilo med deportacijami Judov iz Nemčije po začetku druge svetovne vojne. Na območjih, kjer so deportacije povzročile nekaj nezadovoljstva, so nacistični propagandisti preprosto okrepili svoja prizadevanja za spodbujanje sprejemanja odstranitve "sovražnika v sebi".


Kdo so VF+ in zakaj so se na volitvah tako dobro odrezali?

Ena izmed manjših strank, ki se je uveljavila na šestih demokratičnih državnih in pokrajinskih volitvah v Južni Afriki, je Freedom Front Plus (VF+). Stranka je zdaj peta največja v parlamentu, z 2,38% glasov na nacionalni ravni - v primerjavi z 0,9% v letu 2014. Pridobila je še šest sedežev, s čimer je število poslancev doseglo 10. Čeprav je v primerjavi s tremi vodilnimi strankami - afriško - majhna. Nacionalni kongres (ANC), Demokratično zavezništvo (DA) in Borci za ekonomsko svobodo (EFF) - pridobitve VF+so vseeno presenetile. Thabo Leshilo je prosil Keitha Gottschalka in Dirka Kotzeja za pojasnilo.

Kaj je Freedom Front Plus (VF+) in njena zgodovina?

Dirk Kotze: Freedom Front Plus (VF+) je marca 1994 ustanovil general Constand Viljoen kot odcepljeno skupino Afrikaner-Volksfront, ki se ni hotela udeležiti prvih demokratičnih volitev v Južni Afriki leta 1994. Stranko je registriral za volitve. potem, ko je bilo v začasno ustavo iz leta 1993 podano popuščanje, da se samoodločba vključi kot dodatno ustavno načelo.

Pred splošnimi volitvami leta 2004 se je Svobodna fronta združila s Konzervativno stranko in Afrikaner-Eenheidsbeweging. Leta 2006 se je združila z drugo konzervativno stranko, zvezno zvezo Louisa Luyta, ki se je preimenovala v Freedom Front Plus.

Leta 1994 je bil njen glavni cilj politike vzpostaviti volkstaatali neodvisna država. Prejel je 2,2% glasov. Leta 1999 se je to znižalo na 0,8%, kjer je ostalo na vseh naslednjih volitvah do leta 2014.

Na volitvah leta 2019 se je VF+ vrnil na raven podpore leta 1994 z 2,5% glasov na nacionalni ravni. To je storila tako, da se je najprej v severozahodni provinci razširila na 4,4% deželnih glasov v Gautengu na 3,8% deželnih glasov in v Svobodni državi na 4,1% vseh glasov.

Keith Gottschalk: VF+ ima oranžni, beli in zeleni emblem, ki spominja na zastavo vierkleur Južnoafriške republike Paula Krugerja. Od svojega začetka leta 1994 je stranka zastopala tiste, ki so menili, da je nekdanji predsednik FW de Klerk izdal "Afrikaner volk" temnopoltim ljudem, ANC in Komunistični partiji.

V tem letu je general Constand Viljoen mobiliziral več kot 20 000 oboroženih pripadnikov afriške milice. Prepričal jih je, naj ne sprožijo protirevolucionarne vstaje, ampak namesto tega glasujejo za parlament.

Njegova dejanja naj bi imela široke posledice. Eno je bilo, da so se stranke, ki so se pogajale o koncu apartheida - v postopku, znanem kot Konvencija o demokratični Južni Afriki (Codesa) - ustalile na proporcionalnem reprezentativnem volilnem sistemu, da bi zagotovile, da bodo manjšine - zlasti beli Afričani - zastopane v parlamentu, deželnih zakonodajah , in občine.

Kaj pomeni stranka?

Dirk Kotze: Leta 1994 je bila politika VF osredotočena na ideal a volkstaatali avtonomna regija v Južni Afriki z visoko stopnjo avtonomije skupnosti, zlasti kulturne samoodločbe.

Pogosto so omenjali belgijsko ureditev kulturnih svetov kot model, ki ga je treba upoštevati. Sčasoma je politika volkstaat postala manj izrazita. Od volitev v lokalno vlado leta 2016 se je ponovno opredelila kot stranka manjšin-in ne le belcev, ki govorijo afrikaans.

Za te volitve je ustanovilo partnerstvo z Bruinom Bemagtigingsbewegingom (BBB) ​​Petra Maraisa ali »Gibanjem za opolnomočenje v barvah« in bil nominiran za njihovega kandidata za premierja zahodnega rta. (Rasna klasifikacija je bila temelj vseh zakonov apartheida. Posameznike je uvrstila v eno od štirih skupin: domorodne, barvne, azijske ali bele. "Barvni" ljudje so bili ljudje mešanega evropskega, afriškega ali azijskega porekla.)

V volilnem manifestu je spodbujal decentralizacijo oblasti in večjo vlado skupnosti. Prav tako odločno nasprotuje opolnomočenju črne ekonomije in lastniškemu kapitalu v sedanji obliki ter razlastitvi zemljišča brez odškodnine.

Keith Gottschalk: VF+ zagovarja ustanovitev afrikanerskega sveta, ki bi zastopal geografsko razpršene govorce afrikans v državi. Zavzema se za krščanske vrednote in želi boljši kazenski pregon proti umorom na kmetiji. Tekel je v kampanji, ki je vključevala obljubo podpore

bele in barvne žrtve afirmativnih ukrepov in opolnomočenje črncev.

Kdo so njeni podporniki?

Dirk Kotze: Največja podporna baza VF+je v Gautengu. V vzhodnem rtu in KwaZulu-Natal ima zelo malo podpore. Večina njegovih novih podpornikov je pred tem glasovala za Demokratično zavezništvo. Stališče tožilstva do odločitev univerz v Pretoriji in severozahodu o afrikaansu kot jeziku pouka je omenjeno kot primer ravnodušnosti te stranke do njihovih interesov.

Keith Gottschalk: Na volitvah leta 1999 se je večina afriških volivcev pozitivno odzvala na to, da je Tony Leon v svoji volilni kampanji uporabil slogan "bori se nazaj". Leon je bil vodja liberalne demokratične stranke, ki je danes Demokratična zveza. Na vidiku je imel ANC.

V skladu s tem bojnim klicem je VF+ na teh volitvah uporabil slogan "Slaan terug" (kar v afrikaansu pomeni "udariti nazaj"). Njegov cilj so bile politike pozitivnega delovanja ANC.

Kaj nam njena vse večja priljubljenost pove o Južni Afriki?

Dirk Kotze: Zagotavlja vpogled v zaplete v okviru DA in prehodno fazo, ki jo trenutno doživlja. Dokazuje, da ima stranka težave pri uravnoteženju interesov obstoječih članov z interesi novih članov.

V kontekstu Južne Afrike to niso le materialni ali razredni interesi. Gre tudi za interese in pričakovanja, ki so posledica zgodovinskih okoliščin, in za nove priložnosti v nasprotju s strahom pred izključitvijo iz teh priložnosti.

Leta 1994 je VF+ v času negotovosti med prehodom prejel pomembno podporo. Zadnja vrnitev na enake ravni podpore bi lahko bila znak podobnega občutka negotovosti glede vprašanj identitete, kot je afrikaans kot jezik, in vprašanj, povezanih z raso.

Nekateri bi trdili, da je več sklicevanja na sodišče za enakost zaradi očitkov o sovražnem govoru pokazatelj rasti politike identitete v Južni Afriki.

Na teh volitvah se je za glasovanje potegovalo 48 strank. Nekateri so bili na levici s socialističnim in radikalnim poudarkom, drugi pa so bili ekonomsko in politično bolj konzervativni. To je pomenilo, da so tri glavne stranke (ANC, DA, EFF) morale zasesti središče spektra. To pa je naredilo več prostora za zabave, kot je VF+.

Keith Gottschalk: Največji glas VF+doslej kaže, da DA izgublja volivce Afrikanerja na svoji desni. Poleg tega se zdi, da je VF+ pritegnil nekaj barvnih volivcev. Volilna enota VF+je v veliki večini afriških belih protestantov. Toda ob tej priložnosti se zdi, da je vstopil med barvne konservativce z zmago na podeželskih barvah v zahodnem in severnem rtu.

VF+ se je držal v svojih volilnih oporiščih, ki vključujejo zlasti predmestja Afrikanerja v provincah Gauteng in severozahodni provinci. In seveda je zmagal v veliki večini v Oranii, edinem mestu, ki govori le afriško, na Severnem rtu.

Volivci, ki so podprli VF+, so prišli iz obeh glavnih opozicijskih strank, zlasti iz DA, pa tudi iz ANC. ANC je zaradi hudega delovnega spora v nekaterih državnih oddelkih, vključno s zaporniškimi službami, izgubil množico barvnih volivcev.

Vodje, ki jih je imenoval ANC, so izvedli različico pritrdilnega dejanja, ki je omejila barvno na eno od 11 delovnih mest in eno od 11 napredovanj. Barvni zaporniki so se počutili izdane s strani vlade ANC in njihovega sindikata Proc ANC, Popcru.

Prav sindikat Solitariteit, ki ga je podprl VF+, je prevladoval v Afrikanerju in je v imenu barvnih stražarjev zmagal na preizkusnem primeru.

* Keith Gottschalk je politolog na Univerzi Western Cape, Dirk Kotze pa profesor političnih znanosti na Univerzi v Južni Afriki.

** Tu izražena stališča niso nujno mnenja neodvisnih medijev.


Vodena zgodovina

“ … Potrebujemo tisto generacijo mladih, ki so začeli dosegati politično zrelost sredi discipliniranega in obupanega boja proti meščanstvu. V tem boju ta generacija usposablja pristne komuniste, ki jih mora podrediti temu boju in se z njim povezati na vsakem koraku svojega študija, izobraževanja in usposabljanja. ”

-V.I. Lenin, Naloge mladinskih lig (meščanska in komunistična morala)

Živeli mladi pionirji-vredni nadomestki lenjinistično-stalinističnega komsomola (Vir: Nova galerija, 2000.)

Uvod:

Otroci v Sovjetski zvezi so imeli posebno mesto v srcih državljanov in stranke. They represented not only the innocence of youth, but also the promise of the socialist future in order for the international Marxist Revolution to succeed, the youth had to be treated well and educated politically. Communist authorities took many routes to achieve this goal. Primarily, the Communist Party fostered a cult of childhood, much like Stalin’s cult of personality, which idealized Soviet childhood. The Communist Party formalized this cult through youth organizations such as the Komsomol, Young Pioneers, and Little Octobrists.

Much as Lenin did in his 1920 speech to the Komsomol, this cult relied on a juxtaposition between “true” Communist children and everyone else. By institutionalizing this reverence for childhood, the Communist Party isolated those children who did not join such groups, and were in fact able to create a radical other, or class enemy, before citizens even entered the workforce. The force of this institutionalization was seen most strongly in the formative years of the Soviet Union, and was perfected under Stalin. The effect these groups had is undeniable the Communists created secondary communities for children to align themselves with. Rather than attach themselves most strongly to their families, Soviet children were taught to prioritize Communism above all, and these youth organizations provided the very first encounters with socialism. This had the significant effect of diminishing the role of the family structure, and these groups became the primary outlet for self-expression among Soviet children. To carry the identity card of the Komsomol was to declare oneself a loyal Communist.

Komsomol Membership Card (Wikimedia Commons)

This guided history will attempt to identify different aspects which contributed to the development of the Soviet cult of childhood, from the organization of youth groups, to childhood education, as well as the role of propaganda and nostalgia. It will approach these topics both from political and social perspectives, and display how Communist ideology manipulated the experience of childhood for political gain.

Knjige

Background Information:

Kirschenbaum, Lisa. Small Comrades: Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932 (New York and London: Routledge Falmer, 2001).

In this book, Kirschenbaum traces the institution of kindergarten in the Soviet Union, and uses early childhood education as a lens to understand the Bolshevik ideological revolution. She analyzes how the Communist Party attempted to reconcile economic constraints with the urgent need to educate children on the principles of socialism. She details the way in which ideology was navigated and projected onto young children, and explains that kindergartens in fact became a secondary caregiver as more women moved into the workplace. The text is fundamental in describing just one way in which children were imbued with the Communist spirit, and molded by it.

Kelly, Catriona. Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia 1890-1991 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

Kelly appears to be one of the seminal scholars in the field of Soviet childhood studies, as she has authored numerous books and articles on the topic. This text is especially useful as it provides the reader with a broader scope of inquiry, beginning in tsarist Russia and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union, lending to a useful comparative framework. Most significantly, Kelly attempts to infiltrate the child’s world during these times, and truly recreate it for the reader. She enmeshes herself in all aspects of children’s culture, from heroic stories in children’s literature to the rituals of toilet training. Kelly skillfully refrains from editorializing and moralizing, and instead paints the complexities of childhood life, which though uniquely Russian in this case, seem to also approach some universal themes.

Kelly, Catriona. Comrade Pavlik: The Rise and Fall of a Soviet Boy Hero (London: Granta, 2005).

With this work, Kelly narrows her focus to the now infamous story of Pavel Morozov, a boy whose story achieved cult status in the Soviet Union. Thirteen years old at the time of his death in 1932, Pavlik epitomized the loyalty to the Communist regime that the Party may have hoped from all children. The legend goes that, upon discovering that his father was resisting collectivization, Pavlik turned his father into the local authorities. This act resulted in his (and his younger brother’s) brutal murder by relatives. In the Central Archives, Kelly gained access to the KGB file of Pavlik’s subsequent murder trial, and dedicates a large portion of the book to investigating this. More useful to this topic, however, how this case reflects the life of the child under Stalin, seen in how Pavlik was later glorified as a cult hero of the Young Pioneers and used as a propaganda tool.

Morozov's monument in Sverdlovsk (destroyed). Pioneer deposing oath.

Bronfenbrenner, Urie. Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970).

More informative than analytical, Bronfenbrenner incorporates his training as a social psychologist to study the lives of Soviet children in this 1970 work. Though sometimes misguided in his judgments of American childrearing, he nonetheless details important developments in Soviet society, especially with regard to the organization of the collective, and how that affects childhood. Though much more psychological than historical in method, Bronfenbrenner nonetheless utilizes his own experiences visiting the Soviet Union to explain how the collective nature of Soviet society, with its youth and school groups, as well as the role and influence of non-parental adult figures such as teachers, assist in forming the new Soviet man.

“Other” Children:

Ball, Alan M. And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

In this work, Ball presents the other, darker side of Soviet childhood: homeless children of the 1920s. Ball argues that while the problem of street children (besprizorniki) existed in pre-revolutionary Russia, the numbers in which they existed in the decade following the Bolshevik revolution was staggering, and the largest in Russian history. He points to famine of 1920-1 in particular as having the greatest effect in turning children onto the streets. Ball then traces government attempts to combat this problem, primarily by placing these youth in children’s homes, and comments on the reasons such efforts failed, primarily financial and social. This is an important work to use to juxtapose the contrasting sides of Soviet social policies, and highlights the vast difference in ways of life for privileged children and those abandoned.

Homeless Children Sleeping (1922) Source: Russian State Film & Photo Archive at Krasnogorsk. 2000.

Frierson, Cathy A. and Vilensky, Semyon S. Children of the Gulag. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

Another work focusing on Soviet children abandoned by the Party, Frierson and Vilensky’s documentary history studies the youngest victims of Stalinist repressions. This is a topic not often covered in research on the Gulags, but the two authors investigate the fates of those children whose adults were declared class enemies, or enemies of the people. The arrest of parents not only traumatized the children and marred them socially, but the authors contend that there were very real and practical problems which faced them as well, such as limited access to food and revolting conditions in orphanages. Through the oral histories collected by the authors, they present a story which strongly discredits the notion of a happy Soviet childhood.

Forsaken By Everone, We Have Perished (1920s) This evocative painting depicts street children who are ignored by heartless passers-by. Source: Hoover Political Poster Database. 2007.

Children’s Diaries:

Lugovskaya, Nina. The Diary of a Soviet Schoolgirl: 1932-1937. (Moscow: Glas New Russian Writing, 2003).

Nina begins writing her diary in 1932, at the age of thirteen, as her father returns home to Moscow from Siberian exile. Though detailed in describing her daily life, the diary is more impressive for her vehement denunciations of Stalin and the Communist Party, whom she learns to despise during her father’s three years in exile. This diary would soon be her greatest source of anguish, though, as it was found in a 1937 raid on her family’s apartment by the NKVD. Her last entry is January 3, 1937, the day before the raid. Following this event, Nina, her mother, and two sisters were sentences to five years in the Kolyma labor camps. The four women all survived, and were released in 1942, but Nina’s diary was confiscated by the NKVD, only later to be discovered by researchers in Soviet archives.

Rozenberg, Lena Jedwab. Girl With Two Landscapes: The Wartime Diary of Lena Jedwab, 1941-1945. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002).

This diary was written by Lena Jedwab, a Polish girl who left her home of Bialystok for a Young Pioneers summer camp in June 1941 at the age of sixteen. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, however, the camp was evacuated and she was separated from her family. She spent two years in an orphanage, and then moved to Moscow for university. During this time, the rest of her family was killed in Treblinka, a fact she discovered only after the war ended. Living on a collective farm in the countryside, she adjusts to peasant life, and tries to reconcile socialist beliefs with the anti-Semitism she experiences. Lena herself tries to find the happy childhood spoken of in Soviet propaganda, but to no avail.

Journal Articles

Gorsuch, Anne. “Soviet Youth and the Politics of Popular Culture during NEP.” Social History, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1992): 189-201.

In this article, Gorsuch analyzes how the Bolsheviks struggled to transform Russian society by using the youth population. She analyzes the way in which culture was constructed through projects targeted at Soviet youth, and how the younger generations were seen as the greatest promise to the Bolsheviks. Specifically, she studies the movies and dress of the Soviet urban youth as presenting the biggest cultural hurdle to the Bolsheviks. By studying these aspects of social and cultural life, Gorsuch argues that they had to be overcome by the Bolsheviks in order to construct a cultural hegemony. She explains that while political hegemony was easily established by the Bolsheviks, and was manifested in the youth by the Komsomol, the Bolsheviks would struggle for many years to establish their dominance in the culture of Soviet youth.

Knight, Rebecca. “Representations of Soviet Childhood in Post-Soviet Texts by Liudmila Ulitskaia and Nina Gabrielian” Modern Language Review, 2009 July, Vol.104(3): 790-808.

Here, Knight analyzes the role of collective memory and mythologized nostalgia for childhood in post-Soviet literature. Using the works of two Russian writers in particular, Liudmila Ulitskaia and Nina Gabrielian, Knight demonstrates how recent post-Soviet authors have begun to combat the image of the happy Soviet childhood. Knight contends that two aspects of the Soviet system which created a uniquely Soviet childhood experience. First, the lives of children in the Soviet Union were shaped by state institutions to a larger extent than other Western societies, namely by the regulation of education and leisure activities. These regulations were fundamental in the formation of ideal Soviet citizens. Second, Knight argues that the propaganda of the happy Soviet childhood was effective in idealizing the childhood experience, as well as creating a direct link between the happy child and the successful state. In the rest of the article, Knight traces these two arguments in the works of Ulitskaia and Gabrielian.

Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for our Happy Childhood (1936) Source: Diane P. Koenker: The Soviet Union since 1917. 2002.

Riordan, Jim. “Soviet Youth: Pioneers of Change.” Soviet Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct. 1988): 556-572.

In this article, Riordan focuses on the Soviet “youth,” which he defines as aged from 15-30 years old. Also contrary to other works mentioned here, Riordan studies the role of these young Soviets in the years following Khrushchev’s thaw. Nonetheless, it is an insightful article which details how the objects of the study became the harbingers of change and rebellion in Soviet states at this time. He explains that the youth culture has departed from the hyper-organized ways of Stalinism, and instead begun more to resemble Western, independent countercultures. He claims that by 1985, Soviet youth was no longer synonymous with the Komsomol, and instead began to take more creative forms. His understanding of the role of the Komsomol, and how it had changed by 1985, is significant and lends to a greater understanding Soviet youth rebellions.

Film Resources

Two recently produced documentaries relate to the issue of childhood in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation. Prvi, My Perestroika (2010), follows four Russians who grew up during the time of perestroika. They speak at length about their childhoods, and describe the changes they witnessed in their country. Though not directly related to the cult of childhood, it still studies important themes of nostalgia for the Soviet childhood experience.

A second documentary, Putin’s Kiss (2012), covers the story of Masha Drokova, a leader in the Russian youth organization Nashi. It follows her as she comes to terms with the unseemly side of this organization, and how she tries to cope and reconcile her own values. Nashi could be viewed as an ideological successor to groups such as the Komsomol, and as such is significant in understanding youth culture in the former Soviet Union.

Online Resources

Annals of Communism: Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents:

An online companion to a text collection of the same name, Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov present over 150 documents collected from Soviet archives related to life under Stalinism. The documents relate to penal colonies, collectivization, and operations of the Politburo, but also include relevant texts on the Young Pioneers and Komsomol.

Flickr: My Happy Soviet Childhood:

A flickr group which includes photos related to scenes of everyday life, as well as those related specifically to Soviet children, such as games and toys, classroom scenes, as well as state propaganda.

English Russia: Life of a Soviet Child:

This website has reproduced an American book from the “Children of the World Series” from 1987, detailing the everyday life of the Muscovite girl Katya. Light-hearted and meant for children, the book still offers a glimpse of childhood from the late-Soviet period, and also demonstrates the way in which this was viewed by the West.


A C T I V I T Y

All states have some voting restrictions. Are they necessary? Below are five traditional restrictions on the right to vote. Form small groups to decide whether your state should retain each of these restrictions. Before making a decision on each restriction, the group should discuss and write answers to these two questions:

  1. What are some reasons favoring the restriction?
  2. What are some reasons against the restriction?

After the groups have finished their work, each restriction should be discussed and voted on by the entire class.


Hard Times Return

German leaders, like their counterparts in other countries, looked for ways to end the depression. And like other leaders in 1929, they failed. The chancellor of the Weimar Republic that year was Hermann Müller, a Social Democrat. When he was unable to steer the country toward prosperity, President Paul von Hindenburg named a new chancellor a year later. This time, he chose Heinrich Brüning of the Catholic Center Party.

Brüning convinced President Hindenburg to invoke Article 48 (see reading, Creating a Constitutional Government) to suspend the constitution so that the chancellor would be able to act quickly and decisively, without consulting the Reichstag, to address the severe economic crisis. Even so, Brüning could not pull Germany out of the depression.

To an increasing number of Germans, democracy appeared unable to cope with the economic collapse, and only the most extreme political parties seemed to offer clear solutions to the crisis. The Communist Party won support with their argument that to end the depression, Germany needed a government like the communist one in the Soviet Union. They said that the government should take over all German land and industry from capitalists, who they claimed sought only their own profit. Communists promised to distribute German wealth according to the common good. The Nazis, on the other hand, blamed the Jews, Communists, liberals, and pacifists for the economic crisis in Germany. They promised to restore Germany’s standing in the world and Germans’ pride in their nation. They also promised an end to the depression, campaigning behind slogans such as “Work, Freedom, and Bread!”

Many saw the Nazis as an attractive alternative to democracy and communism. Among them were wealthy industrialists who were alarmed by the growth of the Communist Party. They liked the Nazis’ message: it was patriotic, upbeat, and energetic. Both the Communists and the Nazis made significant gains in the Reichstag elections in 1930.

Number of Deputies in the Reichstag 1928–1932

In 1932, Hitler became a German citizen so that he could run for president in that year’s spring election. His opponents were Ernst Thälmann, the Communist candidate, and Paul von Hindenburg, the independent incumbent. In the election, 84% of all eligible voters cast ballots. One observer noted that as voters went to the polls, each saw the war behind him, “in front of him social ruin, to his left he is being pulled by the Communists, to his right by the Nationalists, and all around him there is not a trace of honesty and rationality, and all his good instincts are being distorted into hatred.” 1

Each voter had to figure out which party offered the best solution to the nation’s problems. To understand those choices, compare the platforms of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party with that of the Nazi Party, which can be found in reading The Beginning of the Nazi Party.

Social Democratic Party Platform

We are committed to maintaining the Republic and a policy that will allow Germany to take its rightful place among the free governments of Europe.

  • We will support the present German Republic so that freedom, democracy, and justice will live in the hearts of our German countrymen.
  • We will honor all of Germany’s obligations, political and financial, in order that Germany’s honor and respect will not be decreased in the eyes of the world.
  • We plan to create more jobs by undertaking an extensive program of public works.
  • We will provide unemployment compensation for up to six months.
  • We will cut government expenditures to lower taxes.
  • We believe in the right of those who disagree with the party to speak and write on those issues without interference.

Communist Party Platform

We are committed to the overthrow of the presently existing, oppressive Republic and all of its economic and social institutions. We favor:

  • The abolition of private property.
  • The establishment of land reform programs, so that the government can take over the land and distribute it for the common good.
  • Government ownership of all industrial productive forces, so that they can be run for the benefit of the people rather than the capitalists.
  • A foreign policy that regards the Soviet Union as an ally against capitalism.

To the German people: The cause of your misery is the fact that French, British, and American capitalists are exploiting German workers to get rich themselves. Germans, unite to get rid of this terrible burden. 2

The German voters re-elected President Hindenburg, with Hitler finishing second. But in elections for the Reichstag held in the months after the presidential election, the Nazis’ popularity increased even more.

1932 Presidential Election

What issues decided the elections? In considering the question, historian Peter Fritzsche focuses on two kinds of lines—one of “anxious men in front of the labor exchange” and one of “storm troopers in parade formation.” In the first three months of 1930, 3.3 million people were unemployed a year later, the number was nearly 5 million, and it jumped to 6.1 million in early 1932. In 1928, 800,000 voters supported the Nazi Party the number jumped to 6.4 million in 1930 and then to 13.4 million in 1932. Fritzsche writes: “At the height of the crisis, in the winter of 1932, more than 40 percent of all workers in Germany were unemployed. Most of these had long since exhausted their claims to unemployment compensation and barely subsisted on the dole.” 3

Was it only the depression that led increasing numbers of Germans to support the Nazis? Historian Richard Evans believes the appeal of the Nazis was more than their pledge to end the depression. He writes that German voters in 1930 were

protesting against the failure of the Weimar Republic. Many of them, too, particularly in rural areas, small towns, small workshops, culturally conservative families, older age groups, or the middle-class nationalist political milieu, may have been registering their alienation from the cultural and political modernity for which the Republic stood. . . . The vagueness of the Nazi programme, its symbolic mixture of old and new, its eclectic, often inconsistent character, to a large extent allowed people to read into it what they wanted to and edit out anything they might have found disturbing. Many middle-class voters coped with Nazi violence and thuggery on the streets by writing it off as a product of excessive youthful ardour and energy. But it was far more than that, as they were soon to discover for themselves. 4

Having studied voting patterns in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s, historian Dick Geary writes: “The Nazi Party was . . . without doubt a Volkspartei [people’s party]: recruiting its members and its voters across a broad range of social groups, from both sexes and from the older as well as the younger generation.” 5 Yet, Geary notes, the Nazis were never able to win a majority of the seats in the Reichstag.


4 The Grapes Of Wrath Was Banned For Showing Poor People With Cars

When Stalin first heard they were making a movie of Grozdje jeze, he was thrilled. This, he believed, would be the perfect piece of anti-American propaganda. The story of the plight of impoverished US laborers would show the dangers of capitalism and the misery that afflicts its poor.

The movie came out in the USSR, titled The Road to Wrath because they couldn&rsquot let anything allude to the Bible. However, instead of pitying the Americans, the Soviet people were impressed because even the poorest people in the film still had their own cars.

The book and film were banned shortly after. The lives of starving Okies, it turned out, were too glamorous to be shown in the communist state.


Cost of Living 1960

1960 The cold war continued to become colder as the two sides distrusted the other more and tried to influence other parts of the world. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson won the Presidency with one of the smallest margins in history ( 113,000 votes ) out of 68.3 million. The sexual revolution of the 60's had begun with the use of birth control pills and Hugh Hefner opening the first of his Playboy clubs in Chicago. The "Flintstones" is shown on television for the first time and movies this year include "The Magnificent Seven" and "Psycho" . Notable technical achievements include the invention of the Laser and a Heart Pacemaker. France tests its first atomic bomb and joins those countries with nuclear bomb technology. Notable names that appear in the limelight that year include "Cassius Clay" and "Sir Francis Chichester" . The US sends the first troops to Vietnam following the French withdrawal in 1954 in the fight against communist North Vietnam.


Richard Nixon: Impact and Legacy

Richard Nixon's six years in the White House remain widely viewed as pivotal in American military, diplomatic, and political history. In the two decades before Nixon took office, a liberal Democratic coalition dominated presidential politics, and American foreign policy was marked by large-scale military interventions in the two decades after, a conservative Republican coalition dominated presidential politics, and direct military intervention was by and large replaced with aid (sometimes covert, sometimes not) to allied forces. Nixon intended his presidency to be epochal and, despite being cut short by Watergate, it was.

Nixon and his presidency are often termed "complex" (sometimes "contradictory"). Scholars who classify him as liberal, moderate, or conservative find ample evidence for each label and conclusive evidence for none of them. This should be expected of a transitional political figure. In foreign and domestic policy, Nixon's inclinations were conservative, but he assumed the presidency at the end of the 1960s, liberalism's postwar peak. He could not achieve his overarching goal of creating a governing coalition of the right without first dismantling Franklin Roosevelt's coalition of the left.

As President, Nixon was only as conservative as he could be and only as liberal as he had to be. He took credit for the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency while privately noting that if he had not taken this liberal step, the Democratic Congress would have forced more liberal environmental legislation on him. This was a President who could philosophically oppose wage and price controls and privately express the conviction that they would not work, while still implementing them for election-year effect. Still his tactical flexibility should not obscure his steadiness of political purpose. He meant to move the country to the right, and he did.

Nixon's most celebrated achievements as President—nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and the diplomatic opening to China—set the stage for the arms reduction pacts and careful diplomacy that brought about the end of the Cold War. Likewise, the Nixon Doctrine of furnishing aid to allies while expecting them to provide the soldiers to fight in their own defense paved the way for the Reagan Doctrine of supporting proxy armies and the Weinberger Doctrine of sending U.S. armed forces into combat only as a last resort when vital national interests are at stake and objectives clearly defined.

But even these groundbreaking achievements must be considered within the context of Nixon's political goals. He privately viewed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the China initiative as ways to blunt criticism from the political left. And while his slow withdrawal from Vietnam appeared to be a practical application of the Nixon Doctrine, his secretly recorded White House tapes reveal that he expected South Vietnam to collapse after he brought American troops home and prolonged the war to postpone that collapse until after his reelection in 1972.

Ultimately, the White House tapes must shape any assessment of Nixon's impact and legacy. They ended his presidency by furnishing proof of his involvement in the Watergate cover-up, fueled a generation's skepticism about political leaders, and today provide ample evidence of the political calculation behind the most important decisions of his presidency. They make his presidency an object lesson in the difference between image and reality, a lesson that each generation must learn anew.



Komentarji:

  1. Doshura

    Absolutno se strinjam s tabo. Mislim, da je to dobra ideja.

  2. Armon

    Nimate prav. Lahko to dokažem. Pišite v PM, govorili bomo.

  3. Worden

    Well, bring, prodigal, welcome back.

  4. Leandro

    Strinjam se, to je izjemen stavek

  5. Carrington

    What eventually it is necessary to it?



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